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PICKING PLAYERS IN THE COLLEGE DRAFT
COULD BE PICKING TROUBLE WITH
ANTITRUST LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The events during the summer and fall of 1994 exposed
fans to the volatile relations between owners of professional
sports franchises and their players. On August 12, 1994, the
Major League Baseball (MLB) players went on strike, result-
ing in the first cancellation of the World Series since 1904.1
Fearing the same economic pressure from its players, the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) instituted a lock-out beginning
September 30, 1994.2 Both leagues had been operating with-
out collective bargaining agreements between the teams and
players. 3 The NHL and its players reached a tentative agree-
ment on January 11, 1995, and saved the season from being
canceled. 4 The MLB teams and its players did not reach an
agreement before a federal judge issued an injunction to re-
sume play under the rules of the expired collective bargaining
agreement.5
The National Basketball Association (NBA) collective
bargaining agreement also expired at the end of the 1993-
1994 season.6 The expiration prompted the NBA to seek a
judgment in federal court declaring that three heavily de-
1. National Basketball Associaton, The Sports Network, Computer Info.
Network, Oct. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS file.
2. Id.
3. Id. To equalize the bargaining power between individual employees
and corporate employers, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) allows em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). A "collec-
tive bargaining agreement" is a labor agreement between a union and employer
which sets forth the terms of employment for those employees in the union. See
id.
4. NHL Players Accept Final Offer - Season Saved, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 12,
1995, at Al. The players agreed to a salary limit for rookies, cutbacks in arbi-
tration rights, and free agency when they reach the age of 32 within four years
of joining the league. Id.
5. Jody Goldstein, NBA Begins First Work Stoppage; Lockout May Bring
Players Together, Hous. CHRON., July 1, 1995, at Sports 1.
6. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Basketball Associ-
ation and the National Basketball Players Association, Art. XXXV, § 1 (1988)
(on file with author) [hereinafter 1988 NBA Agreement].
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bated player restraints were not a violation of antitrust
laws. 7 The court discussed the application of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption 8 to an expired agreement and found
that antitrust immunity did exist.9 Thus, the challenged
player restraints can be imposed by the NBA, as long as a
collective bargaining relationship exists.10 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this
decision.'1
Although the NBA and its players did not have a collec-
tive bargaining agreement during the 1994-1995 season, the
two parties made a "no-lockout, no-strike" agreement in Octo-
ber 1994, guaranteeing that the season would not be inter-
rupted.12 Because the owners and players could not reach a
new agreement before the expiration of this moratorium, the
NBA locked out its players until a collective bargaining
agreement was reached. 13 This lock-out was the first work
7. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995). The NBA and the National Basketball
Players Association (NBPA) have disputed the salary cap, the right of first re-
fusal, and the college draft in the past. See, e.g., Bridgeman v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
8. See discussion infra part II.A.3.
9. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1078. The court reviewed four standards for
determining when a collective bargaining agreement expires, and ultimately
relied on the standard established in Powell v. National Football League, 930
F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption pro-
tects agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining agreement from
challenges under the antitrust laws), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). Wil-
liams, 857 F. Supp. at 1074-78. See also discussion infra part II.B.2.
10. Williams, 857 F. Supp. at 1078. The court also assumed that the non-
statutory labor exemption did not apply and undertook the antitrust rule of
reason analysis. Id. The court held the players "failed to show that the alleged
restraints of trade are on balance unreasonably anti-competitive." Id. at 1079.
Because their "pro-competitive effects ...outweigh their restrictive conse-
quences," the restraints did not violate antitrust laws. Id.
11. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Second Circuit agreed that antitrust immunity exists on the grounds that
multiemployer collective bargaining is embodied in labor laws. Id. at 688. The
court stated that "antitrust laws do not prohibit employers from acting jointly
in bargaining with a common union." Id. Because labor law protects the
league's actions, the court declined to apply the rule of reason analysis. Id.
12. Lee Shappell, It's History - NBA Locks Out Players, ARIz. REPUBLIC,
July 1, 1995, at C1.
13. Id. The players opposed a luxury tax on a team re-signing a free agent
at a salary that causes the team to exceed the salary cap. Id.
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stoppage in NBA history.14 A group of players petitioned the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to decertify the
union,15 and the NLRB granted an election.'
6
On September 12, 1995, the players voted to accept the
deal agreed upon by the NBA and players, 7 and rejected
decertification by a 226 to 134 vote. 8 The lock-out ended on
September 18, 1995, after both the players and owners ap-
proved the collective bargaining agreement.' 9 The new col-
lective bargaining agreement has a six-year life with terms
including: (1) an increase in the salary cap with restrictions
on signing the teams' own free agents; (2) an increase in the
minimum salaries; (3) a rookie salary schedule; (4) a provi-
sion allowing players to receive portions of more revenue
sources; and (5) a decrease in the number of college draft
rounds from two to one after three years of the agreement.2 °
The labor disputes of 1994-1995 are common in the pro-
fessional sports arena.2' The past is filled with unhappy
players making antitrust challenges against the restraints
imposed upon them.22 These players have been successful in
cases where the player restraint was imposed without arm's-
length bargaining, or where the restraint was unreasona-
14. Murray Chass, NBA Locks Out Players in First Work Stoppage, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1995, at 27.
15. Shappell, supra note 12, at C1.
16. Rosco Nance, NBA Union Split over Vote Process, USA TODAY, July 6,
1995, at C1.
17. NBA, Union Agree on Deal, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1995, at D1.
18. Michael Wilbon, Players Know It's Best to Just Say 'Yes,' WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1995, at C1.
19. See Richard Justice, Player Reps Approve NBA Labor Agreement, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 14, 1995, at B1; David Steele, NBA Owners Approve Labor Deal,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1995, at B1.
20. The Deal, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at 126. This comment will
focus on the terms of the 1988 NBA Agreement, even though the events of 1995
resulted in a change in some of those terms.
21. See discussion infra part II.B.
22. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (challenging baseball's re-
serve system); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987)
(challenging NBA salary cap, college draft, and prohibition of player corpora-
tions); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (chal-
lenging the NFL "Rozelle Rule" as a restriction on free agency), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960
(D.N.J. 1987) (challenging NBA salary cap, right of first refusal compensation,
and college draft); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976)
(challenging NFL college player draft), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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ble. 23 The leagues24 have prevailed, however, when the chal-
lenged term has been part of a fully negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreement.25
Although players who are parties to collective bargaining
agreements have not been completely successful in challeng-
ing the restraints based on antitrust laws, courts have not
addressed the issue of whether a potential player of profes-
sional sports can successfully challenge the player restric-
tions in an existing agreement.26 This comment concludes
that player restraints, in particular the college draft, can be
successfully challenged by a potential player for violation of
antitrust laws.
Before this issue is addressed, it must be placed in its
proper context. The background section first explains the dy-
namics of antitrust and labor law.28 Second, the labor exemp-
tions are discussed in relation to professional sports.29 Third,
a review of the college draft procedure will show that it has
group boycott and price fixing features which violate anti-
trust laws.30 Finally, the analysis applies the labor exemp-
tion to the college draft, and it delineates the problem with
using existing antitrust and labor law in the unique industry
of professional sports.3 ' The analysis exposes a dichotomy
which emerges between, certain potential players who are
bound by the labor exemption, and other remote potential
players who can successfully challenge the college draft. 2
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 606 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
24. The terms "teams" and "leagues" will be used interchangeably through-
out this comment, since both entities are usually aligned against the players.
25. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
809 F.2d 954, 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632
F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
26. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports,
1989 DuKE L.J. 339, 341 n.15.
27. See discussion infra part II.C. The college draft (or "the draft") is the
method used by leagues to allocate incoming talent to the teams. Even though
the NBA college draft will be referred to throughout this comment, the issues
and proposals addressed can be applied to any professional sports league.
28. See discussion infra part II.A.
29. See discussion infra part II.B.
30. See discussion infra part II.C.
31. See discussion infra part III.
32. See discussion infra part III.
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Those affiliated with the sports industry are uncertain
whether potential players are bound by an existing collective
bargaining agreement. Because potential players' decisions
are affected by agreement terms, clarity is needed in deter-
mining who is a party to the agreement.
This comment proposes that the differences between the
groups of potential players can be resolved using one of two
methods.33 First, a statutory scheme addressing the unique
aspects of the professional sports industry would eliminate
the dichotomy between the different potential players.34 Al-
ternatively, narrowing the judicial interpretation of the term
"employees" in professional sports cases will fuse the two
groups of potential players.3 5 Implementing either of these
options will remove the uncertainty that currently pervades
professional sports law.
The following discussion of the existing antitrust and la-
bor laws that govern professional sports opens the door to dis-
covering why certain potential players can successfully chal-
lenge the college draft while others cannot.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dynamics Of Antitrust and Labor Law
When Congress promulgated the Sherman Act of 189036
to deter restraints on competition, it did not specifically ad-
dress the agreements between unions and employers which
inherently interfere with commercial business activities.37
Subsequent congressional acts protected labor unions from
antitrust law, while common law created an exemption for
collective bargaining agreements.38 The dynamics of these
policies are explored in this section.
33. See discussion infra part IV.
34. See discussion infra part V.A.
35. See discussion infra part V.B.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
37. Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1994).
38. Id. at 1049-52.
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1. Scope of the Antitrust Law
Antitrust law, as codified in the Sherman Act, was
promulgated to preserve a competitive business economy.39
In section 1 of the Act, Congress proscribes contracts, combi-
nations, and conspiracies that restrain trade.4 0 Section 2 fur-
ther prohibits monopolies in trade or commerce.4 1 With the
exception of MLB, the Supreme Court has found professional
sports leagues are subject to antitrust law because of the vol-
ume of interstate business involved in their activities.4 2
The Court has found violations of the Sherman Act when
industries engage in unreasonable restraints of trade.4 3
Courts have used two methods to analyze the reasonableness
of a restraint of trade: the per se rule and the rule of
reason.
44
a. The Per Se Rule
Some practices are presumed to be unreasonable because
of their obvious effect on competition and lack of any valuable
use.45  Elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of these
practices is unwarranted, and they are considered per se ille-
39. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797, 801-03 (1945).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). This section provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." Id.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This section provides in part: "Every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony. .. ." Id.
42. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)
(basketball); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)
(football); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (box-
ing). But see Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding baseball is exempt from antitrust liability); Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (affirming the baseball exemption based on stare
decisis, but admitting baseball does constitute interstate commerce). Since
baseball has been exempted from antitrust law, any reference to professional
sports leagues in this comment does not include MLB. The baseball exemption,
however, is in danger as a result of the 1994-1995 strike. Reynolds Holding,
Antitrust Question Raised Again, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1994, at Al.
43. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1991) ("[Ihe stan-
dard of reason ... was intended to be the measure used.").
44. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 166
(1977).
45. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
1996] ANTITRUST AND THE COLLEGE DRAFT 829
gal.46 For example, fixing price or output is a per se illegal
activity since it is an agreement among competitors for the
purpose of earning monopoly profits. 47 Resale price mainte-
nance 4 is another per se illegal activity because it denies re-
tailers the ability to set a price at a level lucrative for them-
selves. 49 Group boycotts were traditionally presumed illegal
per se.50 Because the rule of group boycotts has become
eroded by exceptions, the rule of reason has recently been
adopted by the courts.51 However, per se analysis is appro-
priate with a naked boycott, which is a concerted refusal to
deal, without a showing that the refusal is ancillary to any
legitimate group activity. 2
Consequently, a practice can be deemed per se illegal
when either of two situations exist.5 3 The first situation is
when the practice will cause substantial injury to competition
in the great majority of instances. 54 The second is when in-
quiry into the practice at issue would be complicated, time
consuming, expensive, and uncertain.
In the professional sports industry, some courts have ap-
plied the per se rule to player restraints because they have
characteristics like group boycotts and price fixing.56 Most
courts have rejected the per se rule and elected the rule of
46. Id.
47. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPE-
TITION AND ITS PRACTICE 140 (1994).
48. Resale price maintenance occurs when a manufacturer regulates the
price at which a product is resold by wholesalers or retailers. Id. at 393.
49. Id. at 394.
50. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
("Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden category.").
51. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Print-
ing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985) ("The mere allegation of a concerted refusal to
deal does not suffice because not all concerted refusals to deal are predomi-
nantly anticompetitive.").
52. HOVENKAMP, supra note 47, at 201.
53. SULLIVAN, supra note 44, at 193.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976) (recog-
nizing the draft as "a group boycott in its classic and most pernicious form"),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This holding was
reversed on appeal recognizing that the majority of courts reject the per se anal-
ysis in professional sports. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Therefore, this comment will follow case law and analyze the
antitrust implications of the college draft under the rule of reason. See discus-
sion infra part III.D.
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reason analysis because of the uniqueness of professional
sports.57
b. The Rule of Reason
The standard under the rule of reason is "whether the
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business pur-
poses, and is no more restrictive than necessary."58 To in-
quire into a restraint's reasonableness, the rule of reason
analysis is applied when courts are faced with a "unique or
novel business situation."59
Several factors make the professional sports industry
unique. First, unlike other industries, professional sports
leagues have no competition for players' services. 60 Teams
within the leagues are not economic competitors, but rather
work jointly to provide entertainment.61 Second, the players'
unions are not comparable to industrial unions because the
players are not in a central location, and they possess a wide
range of skills, shorter career spans, and seasonal employ-
ment.62 Because of these inherent factors, the rule of reason
analysis has been deemed the appropriate standard in profes-
sional sports cases. 63
Courts have applied the antitrust analysis to labor un-
ions because they generally "obstruct[ ] the free flow of com-
merce between the states."64 Congress, however, intended la-
bor unions to be outside the scope of antitrust law and
enacted the Clayton Act of 191465 to reaffirm this intent.
57. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976)
(concluding that the unique nature of the business of professional football ren-
ders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality rules), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
58. Id. at 620 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d
119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974)).
59. Id. at 619.
60. See Lock, supra note 26, at 356. Although players have the option of
playing in other countries such as Europe, Canada, and Japan, these leagues
are not competitors to United States leagues because they are not in American
markets, and spectator or television revenues and salaries are much lower. See
id. at 356 n.99.
61. See id. at 357.
62. See id. at 356.
63. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-20 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
64. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 293 (1908) (holding boycott of stores that
sold hats produced by striking union members violated the Sherman Act).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). This section provides in part:
[Vol. 36830
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2. The Statutory Labor Exemption
The Clayton Act was designed to limit the courts' appli-
cation of injunctive relief against labor union activities.66
Still, courts narrowly interpreted the Clayton Act as not
wholly exempting union activities from the Sherman Act.67
The most recognized case in which the Supreme Court
found labor activity unlawful was Duplex Printing Press v.
Deering.68 In that case, the labor union attempted to union-
ize one plant of a newspaper press manufacturer by enlisting
the help of employees of other affiliated plants.6 9 The actions
of these employees consisted of threatening customers or
trucking companies hired by the customers, notifying repair
shops not to repair Duplex presses, and preventing the sale of
presses.70 The Court found these activities constituted a
"secondary boycott" 71 and were not protected by the Clayton
Act.72 Because the Court circumvented the purpose of the
Clayton Act, further congressional action was necessary.
In response to Duplex Printing, Congress enacted the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 73 to provide further protection for un-
ions. This Act restricts judicial injunctions, in the interest of
public policy, to a limited number of labor activities. 74 In ef-
fect, the Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserts the general public
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence of labor, agriculture, or horticultural organizations, insti-
tuted for the purposes of mutual help,... or to forbid or restrain indi-
vidual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof ....
Id.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988).
67. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
805-06 (1945) (reviewing the cases involving union activities found in violation
of the Sherman Act).
68. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
69. Duplex Printing Press, 254 U.S. at 464.
70. Id.
71. The Court defined "secondary boycott" as exercising coercive pressure
upon customers for the purpose of stopping business with the employer through
fear of loss or damage to themselves. Id. at 466.
72. Id. at 475.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 102 ("It is necessary that [the individual unorganized
worker] have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment."). See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113 (regarding limitations
on restraining orders and injunctions).
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policy first stated in the Clayton Act because it does not spec-
ify the types of permissible union activity.75 Together, the
Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act constitute the
statutory labor exemption which shields certain union activ-
ity from antitrust liability.76
The statutory labor exemption, however, does not encom-
pass the collective bargaining agreements between unions
and non-labor groups or employers which inherently restrain
trade.77 The collective bargaining process is promoted by
Congress in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of
1947.78 Congress believed that "the protection by law of the
rights of employees to bargain collectively safeguards com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and pro-
motes the free flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife."79 Unfortunately, the
NLRA does not clarify how the agreements reached through
collective bargaining are protected from antitrust laws.
Therefore, courts have the task of determining when anti-
trust law should apply to collective bargaining agreements.8 0
3. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
Courts have recognized that the purpose of the NLRA
would be undermined if antitrust laws were applicable to
agreements between unions and employers. 81 Consequently,
they have balanced the interest of preserving a competitive
business economy with the rights of labor in collective bar-
gaining by formulating what is referred to as the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. 2 The Supreme Court articulated this
doctrine in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 3 as
follows:
75. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 529 (1979).
76. Lock, supra note 26, at 351; Corcoran, supra note 37, at 1049.
77. See Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964
(D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
80. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 529.
81. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976)
(citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616 (1965)), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
82. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806 (1945).
83. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
832 [Vol. 36
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Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the
national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Re-
lations Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act
union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long,
employees must work. An agreement on these subjects
between the union and the employers in a bargaining
union is not illegal under the Sherman Act... .4
Courts, however, have applied the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption only to parties of the agreement and to matters that
primarily affect the employment relationship.8 5 Thus, the
scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption has been defined
by courts in consideration of public policy on a case-by-case
basis.8 6
In the professional sports arena, courts have formed and
applied a specific test to determine whether the nonstatutory
labor exemption 7 prohibits players from challenging re-
straints in the collective bargaining agreement. 8 The evolu-
tion of this test is discussed in the following section.
B. The Labor Exemption and Professional Sports
Because every major professional sports league has a
union to represent player interests, the agreements between
the leagues, teams, and players may be subject to the labor
exemption. 9 The professional sports cases focus on chal-
lenges by current players against player restraints encom-
passed in a valid or expired collective bargaining agreement.
1. The Mackey Standard
In Mackey v. National Football League,90 veteran players
challenged a restraint known as the "Rozelle Rule." 91 The
84. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 691.
85. See, e.g., Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 616 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 676; see also
Lock, supra note 16, at 352.
86. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 530.
87. The remainder of this comment will refer to the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption as "the labor exemption."
88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
89. By the late 1960's, the various players' associations were recognized as
unions and considered to be the players' exclusive bargaining representative.
ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, 1 LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS IN-
DUSTRIES 107 (1986).
90. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
91. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611. The "Rozelle Rule" mandated that a team
signing a free agent player (the player's contract with an NFL team had ex-
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National Football League (NFL) unilaterally adopted the "Ro-
zelle Rule" as a term of the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws
which bound the players through their Standard Player Con-
tracts.92 The players asserted that the "Rozelle Rule" re-
stricted players' movement between teams and depressed
player salaries. 93 The NFL indicated that the term was nec-
essary for maintaining competitive balance among the teams
and for protecting the investment made in scouting, select-
ing, and developing players.9 4 To determine the validity of
the "Rozelle Rule," the court answered two questions: (1)
whether the collective bargaining agreement provided the la-
bor exemption shield for the term; and (2) if not, whether the
term was so unreasonable as to violate antitrust law.95
a. The Labor Exemption Elements
After reviewing the history of the labor exemption,9 6 the
court concluded that protection of a collective bargaining
agreement depends on "whether the relevant federal labor
policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust pol-
icy under the circumstances of the particular case. "97 The la-
bor exemption will shield agreement terms if three factors ex-
ist.9" The Mackey court stated that the following elements
would accommodate both antitrust and labor laws:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may
potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws
where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second,
pired) pay compensation to the player's former club. Id. at 610. If mutual
terms were not met, the Commissioner (Alvin Ray "Pete" Rozelle) was author-
ized to award compensation. Id. at 611.
92. Id. at 610. The Standard Player Contracts provided that the players
agreed to comply with and be bound by the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. Id.
at 613.
93. Id. at 615. Professional sports players have maintained that player re-
straints such as the "Rozelle Rule," right of first refusal, salary cap, and college
draft, restrict players' movement and suppress salaries. See supra note 22.
The professional sports cases discussed in this comment also used this
rationale.
94. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611. The leagues consistently defend their prac-
tices, stating the necessity of maintaining competitive balance. See infra notes
195-99 and accompanying text.
95. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
96. Id. at 611-13.
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id. at 614.
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federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail
only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the
policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the de-
gree necessary to override antitrust laws only where the
agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona
fide arm's-length bargaining.
99
As courts continued to use this test, the factors were clar-
ified. For instance, the term "parties to the collective bar-
gaining relationship" has been interpreted broadly. 100 Addi-
tionally, the NLRA defined "mandatory subjects of
bargaining" as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment."' 1 Finally, courts examined the history of
the parties' negotiations to find whether "arm's-length bar-
gaining" occurred. 1 2
If these three elements exist, the rights of labor to collec-
tively bargain outweigh the antitrust laws. 1 3 In contrast, if
one of these elements is missing, antitrust law will override
labor law, making the rule of reason analysis applicable.1
0 4
b. Application of the Standard
Before determining whether antitrust law was involved,
the Mackey court applied the three factors to the facts of the
case. 10 5 The court quickly stated that the first element was
met because only parties to the agreement - veteran players
- were affected by the "Rozelle Rule."'0 6 The term was also
found to be a mandatory subject of bargaining because it af-
99. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although Mackey is not a
Supreme Court case, courts faced with the issue of collective bargaining in pro-
fessional sports have followed Mackey's three-part test, or have employed simi-
lar tests, to determine if the nonstatutory labor exemption applied. See, e.g.,
Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); National Bas-
ketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 45
F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 130
(D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Bridgeman v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964-65 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmerman v. National
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986).
100. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
102. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Zimmerman v. National Football
League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986).
103. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 615-16.
106. Id. at 615.
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fected player mobility and repressed salaries. 10 7 Finally, the
court found the rule was not a product of bona fide arm's-
length negotiation, but was unilaterally implemented by the
league prior to the agreement's execution. 108 Thus, the labor
exemption did not shield the "Rozelle Rule."10 9
Next, the court examined the reasonableness of the re-
straint to determine if it violated antitrust law. 110 The court
dismissed the application of the per se rule because of the
uniqueness of NFL operations."' Under the rule of reason
analysis, the restraint was found unreasonable because of its
unlimited duration, lack of procedural safeguards, and the
availability of less restrictive alternatives. 1 12 Hence, the
court held the "Rozelle Rule" was a violation of antitrust
law. 113
2. Extending the Labor Exemption Beyond the
Agreement's Expiration
The NFL revised the term in its next agreement, but the
Right of First Refusal/Compensation provision was also chal-
lenged.1 4 In Powell v. National Football League (Powell I),
the court found the three Mackey factors present," 5 and the
issue became whether the labor exemption shielded the new
provision even after the collective bargaining agreement ex-
107. Id.
108. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. Although the union received increased pen-
sion benefits and players' rights to individually negotiate their salaries, the
court found that the exchange was not quid pro quo. Id. Additionally, the court
indicated that the union's status quo acceptance of the unilaterally imple-
mented terms did not immunize the "Rozelle Rule" from antitrust scrutiny. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 619.
112. Id. at 622.
113. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622.
114. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988),
rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). Under
the Right of First Refusal/Compensation provision, when a veteran player's con-
tract expired and a competing NFL team made an offer to that player, the cur-
rent team had the right to match the offer. Id. at 779. If the current team
decided not to match the offer, the competing club was required to pay "compen-
sation" to it. Id. Under this system, only one player moved in 10 years. Id. at
780-81.
115. Id. at 784. Unlike the "Rozelle Rule," the Right of First Refusal/Com-
pensation provision was incorporated into an extensively negotiated collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 780.
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pired.116 The court held that the labor exemption survives
past the expiration of the agreement until the parties reach
an impasse. 117
This decision, however, was overruled by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Powell i/).118
Powell II rejected the impasse standard because it did not
consider the available remedies under federal labor law for
unfair labor practices. 119 Instead, the court held that the la-
bor exemption continues as long as there is an ongoing collec-
tive bargaining relationship.
120
Courts have followed different standards regarding the
duration of the labor exemption, as evidenced by the different
standards in Powell I and Powell 11.121 Two district courts
also used different standards. In Bridgeman v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n,'22 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey stated that the labor exemption survives
as long as "the employer continues to impose that restriction
unchanged, and reasonably believes that the practice or a
close variant of it will be incorporated in the next collective
bargaining agreement."12 3 However, in Brown v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc. ,124 the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia found that the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement eliminated the labor exemption.' 2 These
cases illustrate how different outcomes can result from simi-
lar situations when there is no clear application of the labor
exemption to the unique industry of professional sports.
116. Id. at 783.
117. Id. at 787.
118. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
119. Id. at 1302. Labor law remedies include employee strikes, employer
lock-outs, and petitioning the NLRB for a cease and desist order prohibiting the
unfair labor practice. Id.
120. Id. at 1303. As a result of this decision, the NFL Player's Association
decertified as a union to terminate the collective bargaining relationship so that
it could bring antitrust actions against the NFL. See McNeil v. National Foot-
ball League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
121. A complete analysis of the duration of the labor exemption can be found
in Lock, supra note 26.
122. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
123. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967.
124. 782 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that the Powell II standard is applicable because the courts must
recognize a "proper respect for national labor policy").
125. Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 135.
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3. Defining the Scope of Parties to the Collective
Bargaining Relationship
Each standard above was discussed in the context of
whether the restraint could be challenged by current players,
since a collective bargaining agreement term can be shielded
by the labor exemption if it affects only the parties to the bar-
gaining relationship. 126 In Powell I and Powell 11, the re-
straint was challenged by NFL veteran players. 12  The
Bridgeman plaintiffs consisted of current and former NBA
players and first round draft choices. 128 In Brown, the play-
ers were part of NFL developmental squads.129 The plaintiffs
in these cases were found to be parties to the collective bar-
gaining relationship because they were current or drafted
players. 13 0 The following cases have also broadly defined the
scope of parties to the collective bargaining relationship.''
a. Wood: A Drafted Player
In Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n,132 three terms of
the NBA collective bargaining agreement were challenged by
a drafted player who never signed a contract.' 33 Reviewing
the development of these provisions in the NBA's collective
bargaining history, the court noted the terms were in a settle-
ment agreement approved by it and the court of appeals.13 1
The court speculated that it was unlikely an agreement con-
126. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
127. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D. Minn.
1988), revd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
128. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 961 (D.N.J.
1987).
129. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd,
50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
130. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965 n.4 ("[The player restraints] affect only
the terms and conditions upon which current and prospective players are em-
ployed by NBA teams and do not affect any product market in which the NBA
competes.").
131. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). The broad defi-
nition of "employee" is expressed by Congress in understanding that self-organ-
ization of employees may extend beyond a single plant or employer. Id. at 192
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937)).
132. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
133. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 526. The three challenged terms were the NBA
salary cap, the college draft, and the prohibition of players corporations. Id.
134. Id. at 528 (referring to Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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taining provisions in violation of antitrust law would be ac-
ceptable to "two levels of the judiciary."1 35
Indeed, the player's claim that he was not bound by the
agreement, since he was not an NBA player when the con-
tract was implemented, was rejected.136 The court stated:
"At the time an agreement is signed between the owners and
the players' exclusive bargaining representative, all players
within the bargaining unit during the life of the agreement
are bound by its terms."13 v Thus, the court held the labor ex-
emption applied because the player came within the bargain-
ing unit when he was drafted.1
3 8
This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, 3 9 re-
lying on the NLRA, which defines "employee" as any em-
ployee, not limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer. 140 The appellate court compared the college draft to
a hiring hall where unions provide for the exclusive referral
of workers, and noted that many union-employer agreements
disadvantage newcomers.' 4' The court also found that re-
strictions to parties outside the bargaining unit were a "com-
monplace consequence" of collective bargaining agree-
ments.' 42 The antitrust challenge was consequently
denied. 143
b. Zimmerman: A Player for Another Professional
League
Relying on the Wood decision, the court in Zimmerman v.
National Football League14 4 found a player for the United
States Football League (USFL) a party to the NFL collective
bargaining relationship. 45 The player challenged an NFL
procedure called the "supplemental draft," where teams se-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 529.
137. Id. (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944); NLRB v.
Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966)).
138. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
139. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
141. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 963.
144. 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
145. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405 ("As a potential NFL player, Zimmer-
man was part of the collective bargaining relationship between the NFLPA and
the NFL to the extent necessary for purposes of the labor exemption.").
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lected players already under contract with professional foot-
ball leagues other than the NFL. 146 Once a player was
drafted, as in the college draft, he was restricted to negotiate
only with that team if he attempted to enter the NFL. 147 The
challenger had been drafted in the supplemental draft while
he was playing for the USFL. 148
To determine if the labor exemption applied, the court
followed the three-part Mackey test and found all elements
had been met.149 As in Wood, the player was considered a
potential employee and part of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship.150 Thus, the labor exemption shielded the claim
against antitrust scrutiny. 51 Hence, Zimmerman made it
lawful for the NFL to implement a supplemental draft of
USFL players to secure their services in the event they left
the USFL, locking the players into negotiations with only one
NFL team. 52
c. Players Within or Entering the Bargaining Unit
During the Term of the Agreement
These broad interpretations of who is a party to the bar-
gaining relationship have made it difficult for any potential
player of professional sports to challenge a collective bargain-
ing term because of the labor exemption.
Wood, relying on a Supreme Court decision, indicated
that the collective bargaining relationship consists of "all
players within the bargaining unit and those who enter the
bargaining unit during the life of the agreement." 53 In pro-
fessional sports, a player does not become part of the bargain-
ing relationship until he15 4 has entered the bargaining
146. Id. at 400.
147. See discussion infra part II.C.
148. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 402.
149. Id. at 408.
150. Id. at 405. The agreement was also found to be formed under arm's-
length negotiations because there was an adequate exchange of terms. Id. at
408.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 405.
153. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944)), aff'd, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987).
154. The author will refer to potential players as males since the focus of this
comment is on professional basketball players. This language is in no way in-
tended to be sexist, but a recognition of the reality that only males currently
play in the professional ranks of the NBA.
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unit.15 5 In other words, he becomes a party to the bargaining
relationship once he has been drafted by or signed a contract
with a team."5 6 It is disputable whether a person who has
not been drafted by or contracted with a team can challenge
the college draft, since he has not entered the bargaining
unit. This comment suggests that a remote potential player
is affected by the college draft and can successfully bring an
antitrust action.157 The discussion below indicates that the
college draft has group boycott and price fixing characteris-
tics that violate antitrust laws.
C. The College Draft
Men seeking entry into a league are subject to the college
draft implemented by the professional sports leagues. The
college draft was adopted by the leagues prior to unionization
of the players in order to allocate new players among existing
teams. 158 After the players recognized the unions, the college
draft was incorporated into the subsequent existing collective
bargaining agreements. 15 9 The following review of the NBA
college draft process and the conflicts that arise exemplifies
the need for modification in this area of professional sports
law.
1. The NBA College Draft
a. The Lottery System
The college draft is the selection of players made in in-
verse order of the team's standing during the previous sea-
son. 160 The effect of this process is to allow the unsuccessful
teams to select the most talented players in the draft.' 61 The
purpose of the college draft is supposedly to equalize playing
talent among the teams in the league.'
62
155. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529.
156. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. XXIX. The Player's Associa-
tion is the exclusive bargaining representative for persons who are "employed
as professional basketball players (and/or who may become so employed during
the term of the contract)." Id.
157. See discussion infra part III.
158. Interview with Ethan Lock, Esq., professor at Arizona State University,
in Palo Alto, Cal. (Sept. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Lock Interview]. See also WEIS-
TART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 504.
159. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV.
160. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 504.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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With the lottery system, however, the team with the
worst record is not guaranteed to pick first. 163 The seven low-
est ranked teams are involved in the lottery system.164 Cards
indicating each of the seven teams are randomly drawn from
a drum.165 The team chosen first picks seventh in the draft;
the team chosen second, sixth; etc. 166 This process continues
until all teams are drawn, with the last team earning the
number one draft position.167
b. The NBA Terms
Once a player is drafted ("draftee"), he is bound by the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the
NBA and the union.1 68 Article IV of the 1988 NBA Agree-
ment outlines the situations in which a draftee is limited to
negotiating with only one team.1 69 First, the team has exclu-
sive rights to negotiate with the draftee for one year as long
as the team has made the required tender.1 7 0 The player who
does not accept the team's offer re-enters the draft the follow-
ing year ("subsequent draft").1 71
Second, during the subsequent draft, another (or the
same) team can draft the player and retain exclusive rights
for one year if the required tender is made. 172 If the player
does not accept the second offer, he is able to negotiate with
163. Ted Steinberg, Negotiating National Basketball Association Contracts,
in 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 7.03[1] (Gary A. Uberstine
ed., 1994).
164. Id.
165. Id. The three worst teams are not placed into the drum until the sev-
enth selection is made, so that they are guaranteed a position in the top six. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987); Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C.
1986).
169. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV. Although the NBA and its
players agreed to new terms effective September 18, 1995, the only significant
change in the draft provisions is the decrease in the number of rounds after the
third year of the agreement. The Deal, supra note 20, at 126.
170. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(b). "Required tender"
means delivering a contract to the player on or before September 5 following the
draft (which occurs in June), that contains the team's signature and is in the
form of the standard player contract for a one-year term at the minimum sal-
ary. Id.
171. Id. § l(c).
172. Id.
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any team one year later.173  Consequently, if a player is
drafted, the team can exclusively negotiate with him for a
maximum of two years. 17 4 If the team never makes the re-
quired tender or the player is not drafted in the subsequent
draft, however, he is free to negotiate with any team. 175 A
team that negotiates with a player it did not select is penal-
ized. 176 Thus, teams will exclusively negotiate with only
those players they have drafted.
2. The Conflict
The players bidding for a spot on a professional team are
selling their services. The college draft limits the player to
negotiating with one team.177 Although the players may ne-
gotiate with any team under certain circumstances, 178 they
argue that the college draft acts as a limit on their bargaining
power. 179 In order to play professional sports, the incoming
player must go along with the system set up by the
leagues.18 0 If the player cannot reach an agreement with the
drafting team, he cannot play in the league.18 ' Essentially,
the league has maintained a group boycott because it refuses
to deal with the players unless they adhere to the league's
terms. 182
173. Id.
174. Nothing in the 1988 NBA Agreement precludes a team from drafting
the player in the subsequent draft after they could not reach agreement the
prior year. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(c).
175. Id. § 1(d), (e). However, the team will make the required tender be-
cause it desires to have exclusive rights over a player. Lock Interview, supra
note 158.
176. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1073
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
177. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
178. These circumstances include: the team does not make the required
tender on or before September 5; the player does not sign a contract after two
draft years; the player does not sign a contract and is not drafted in the second
draft year; or when the player is not drafted. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note
6, Art. IV, § 1(c)-(e).
179. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 504.
180. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (reviewing the draft and reserve clauses of a settlement agreement which
eventually became the collective bargaining agreement), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1977). A detailed history of NBA collective bargaining can be found in Wil-
liams, 857 F. Supp. at 1069.
181. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
182. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 893.
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The issue of the college draft's legality under antitrust
law was addressed in Smith v. Pro-Football.18 3 The player
was the twelfth selection in the NFL college draft. 8 4 He
signed a one-year, $50,000 contract, even though he was ex-
pected to be one of the best defensive backs ever to play foot-
ball. 185 The player argued that the group boycott aspects of
the draft made it impossible for him to obtain the true value
of his services. 18
6
The court found that the draft was not a group boycott in
the traditional sense, because teams were not combining to
exclude competitors on their level of the market.18 7 The draft
did, however, call for cooperation among participants, which
resulted in some type of concerted refusal to deal."8 8 Using
the rule of reason analysis, 8 9 the court found the draft was
an unreasonable restraint of trade because of its "anticompe-
titive impact on the market of players' services." 90 Addition-
ally, the draft went beyond the level of restraint reasonably
necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business pur-
poses might be asserted, because there were less restrictive
alternatives.' 9 ' Hence, Smith found that the draft was an
unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of the antitrust
laws. 19
2
In addition to the group boycott, the players have gener-
ally asserted that the draft results in a concerted refusal to
deal, which, in turn, suppresses salaries to the point of price
fixing. Price fixing applies to "any arrangement among com-
petitors which, in purpose or effect, directly or indirectly in-
hibits price competition." 193 Since the players can only nego-
tiate with one team, they contend that the league is price
183. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1174.
184.' Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 741.
187. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
188. Id. at 1180.
189. Id. (discussing why the per se rule is inappropriate to apply in profes-
sional sports).
190. Id. at 1183.
191. Id. at 1187. The court listed several viable alternatives, such as de-
creasing the number of players a team may sign, allowing negotiations with the
team of the players' choice if the drafting team did not make an acceptable offer,
running fewer rounds, or eliminating the draft. Id. at 1188.
192. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1189.
193. SULLIVAN, supra note 44, at 198.
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fixing because the system eliminates economic competition in
the hiring of players. 194 Considering the above antitrust
problems, the players believe they have valid claims against
the leagues.
In contrast, the leagues argue that their stated purpose
for the college draft is to maintain a competitive balance be-
tween the teams. 195 Without the draft, the best players will
migrate to the teams that can pay the highest salaries.19 6
Additionally, the draft prevents winning teams from accumu-
lating talent by allowing weaker teams the chance at the best
entering players. 197 If a limited number of teams continually
received the best talent, the leagues believe the game would
become predictable and fan interest would dissipate. 198
Therefore, the leagues contend that the college draft is neces-
sary for the viability of the league as a whole.' 99
The argument between the players and the leagues has
been repeatedly litigated.20 0 The courts, however, have not
weighed the arguments when someone more remote from the
bargaining relationship, but affected like drafted players,
challenges the player restraints.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statement of the Problem
The college draft acts adversely against all players who
want to enter the league. As the following hypothetical will
illustrate, however, only certain potential players can effec-
tively challenge the college draft as a violation of antitrust
law.20 1 Because of courts' broad application of the labor ex-
emption, one group of potential players is covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreement terms, while the other group is
not.20 2 Thus, there is a dichotomy between those who can
successfully challenge player restraints and those who
cannot.
194. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867,893 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
195. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 505.
196. Id. at 596.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. See discussion supra part II.B.
201. See discussion infra part III.B.
202. See discussion infra part III.C.
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This comment proposes two solutions that will bridge the
gap between the different potential players.2 °3 Adopting
either of the proposals suggested in part IV would bring clari-
fication into professional sports law by eliminating the uncer-
tainty of whether potential players are bound by the existing
collective bargaining agreement. Once the law has been so-
lidified, those affiliated with the sports industry will be able
to make informed decisions regarding the coverage of collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
B. Illustrative Hypothetical
20 4
Suppose the NBA has a collective bargaining agreement
for a six year term, from June 1995 to June 2001. This agree-
ment also contains a college draft system identical to the one
described in part II.C. Assume a high school senior ("the se-
nior") with exceptional basketball skills graduates in June
1996. He has two choices. First, he can renounce his inter-
collegiate eligibility and elect to enter the 1996 NBA draft.20
Alternatively, the senior can enter college, play intercollegi-
ate sports for four or five years,20 6 and then enter the 2000 or
2001 draft.20 7 In either case, he will enter the draft during
the term of the six year agreement. According to case law, he
is considered a potential player and a party to the collective
bargaining relationship. 20 Thus, the senior could not suc-
cessfully challenge the college draft because of the labor
exemption.
Further assume an equally talented high school junior
("the junior") graduates in 1997 with the same options as the
senior. If the junior elects to enter the draft after his high
school graduation, he will be subject to the draft because he
enters the league during the term of the agreement.20 s On
203. See discussion infra part IV.
204. The following hypothetical will be referred to throughout the remainder
of this comment to illustrate the problems with the application of the labor
exemption to the college draft.
205. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(h).
206. A college player's eligibility clock starts when he begins full-time stud-
ies. He has five years to play four years of intercollegiate sports. The extra
year is called the "red shirt" year, in which the player practices with the team
but does not play in games. The player can red shirt any year; but if he chooses
not to red shirt, he can only play four years. Lock Interview, supra note 158.
207. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(h).
208. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
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the other hand, the junior can attend college and play five
years of intercollegiate sports. By the time he enters the pro-
fessional sports arena in 2002, the agreement will have ex-
pired. Any new agreement may eliminate the draft provi-
sion, 2 10 or the union may no longer exist.21' Hence, the junior
is not considered a party to the collective bargaining relation-
ship since he will not enter the league during the term of the
agreement.
Because the future of the college draft is uncertain, the
junior's decision as to which path he chooses is affected by the
agreement. For example, if the draft applies when the junior
graduates from high school, his incoming salary may be re-
pressed from the negotiation restrictions.2 12 The junior most
likely will take a wait-and-see attitude, since he may not face
such a constraint if he attends college first. Alternatively, the
junior can successfully challenge the college draft, as a viola-
tion of antitrust law, before he graduates from high school.213
C. The Labor Exemption Should Not Apply
The first hurdle to overcome when challenging a player
restraint is the labor exemption. Since the college draft is en-
compassed in an existing collective bargaining agreement,
the labor exemption may create a barrier against the applica-
tion of antitrust law.21 4
1. Application of the Second and Third Elements of
the Mackey Standard
Using the Mackey analysis, one factor to consider is
whether the college draft is a mandatory subject of bargain-
210. The new NBA agreement reduced the draft from two rounds to one
round after three years. The Deal, supra note 20, at 126. There is also the
possibility that the draft will ultimately be eliminated.
211. See supra note 120. Additionally, several NBA players began a decer-
tification effort during the 1995 lock-out, which illustrates the players' desire to
bargain individually. NBA Dissidents Hang Tough on Decertification, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 1995, at D5.
212. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
213. As will be explained in part III.C.2, the junior is not a party to the bar-
gaining relationship who is affected by the agreement. His injury gives him
standing to sue. Cf Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398,
408 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding no injury because, whether he was drafted in the
supplemental draft or the regular draft, he would have been restricted to nego-
tiating with only one team).
214. See supra notes 81-157 and accompanying text.
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215Th coring. The courts agree that the college draft affects the
terms and conditions of employment since it determines
which team has exclusive rights to the player's services.216
Accordingly, it has been found that the matters inherent in
the college draft constitute mandatory subjects of
bargaining.2 17
A second factor of the Mackey analysis is whether the col-
lective bargaining agreement is the product of bona fide
arm's-length negotiations. 218 The college draft was first im-
plemented by the league before the union was formed.21 9
Once the players recognized the union, the negotiations be-
tween the NBA and the players' union created a colorful his-
tory of extensive bargaining, including court supervision.22 °
Since 1976, the collective bargaining agreements have con-
tained a provision implementing the college draft.221 Conse-
quently, the courts have concluded that the college draft is
the result of bona fide arm's-length negotiations.22 2
215. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
216. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). See also Bridgeman v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 n.4 (D.N.J. 1987).
217. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.D.C. 1976) ("It is
clear that the union and the teams could collectively bargain all monetary com-
pensation, benefits, incentives, and guarantees to be paid to first-year players
as mandatory subjects."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
218. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
219. Lock Interview, supra note 158.
220. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
221. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995).
222. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Bridgeman v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987). But see Smith v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The player was drafted by the NFL prior to inception of the
players' association. The court stated that the exemption does not extend to
arrangements imposed unilaterally by employers prior to recognition of union
representation. Id. at 742.
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2. Application of the First Mackey Element
The final factor of the Mackey analysis brings the college
draft outside the labor exemption if it is challenged by a re-
mote player 223 affected by its application.
a. Remote Players are Outside the Collective
Bargaining Relationship
Consider the junior in the scenario above.224 He may not
avail himself to the college draft until the agreement has ex-
pired. The courts agree that potential players are part of the
collective bargaining relationship when those players will be-
come employed during the term of the agreement.22 5 Assum-
ing the junior elects to attend college and does not leave col-
lege early to play professional basketball, he will not be
drafted by or contract with any team during the term of the
agreement. Thus, the junior would not be considered an em-
ployee or potential player and would be excluded from the col-
lective bargaining relationship.
The foundation for considering potential employees part
of the collective bargaining unit was formed in industrial
cases. 226 Because these cases found that potential employees
are part of the bargaining relationship, the union must con-
sider them when bargaining.227 In addition, the definition of
"employees" has been interpreted broadly because of Con-
gress' intent to cover self-organization of employees that ex-
tends beyond a single plant or employer.228
The purpose of this broad definition cannot be extended
to the professional sports arena because of the inherent dif-
ferences between the two fields.229 The uniqueness of the
players' skills and talent is not comparable to the uniform
223. For the purposes of this comment, "remote player" refers to a man in
the position of the junior in the illustrative hypothetical - someone who would
not enter the league during the term of the collective bargaining agreement.
224. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
225. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944)), aff'd, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987).
226. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968
F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
227. Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 529 (citing NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage
Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966)).
228. See supra note 131.
229. Lock, supra note 26, at 354.
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skills of industrial workers.2 30 Also, the men who become
professional players are few and far between, whereas the in-
dustrial worker is more easily nurtured.2 31 Finally, the
shorter career span and seasonal employment of professional
sports players create different needs than those of industrial
workers.23 2 Therefore, the general rules governing industrial
cases cannot encompass the unique industry of professional
sports.
The inclusion of pre-college men in the group of potential
players makes the coverage too far-reaching. In the indus-
trial setting, potential employees do not become part of the
bargaining unit until they are applicants of the employer.2 3
Likewise, the junior does not become a member of the profes-
sional sports bargaining relationship until he submits him-
self to the college draft or the professional arena.234
In the illustrative hypothetical, the junior would bring
his cause of action before entering the league. Unlike the
player in Wood,235 the junior would not be drafted by a team
when he brings his antitrust action. The Wood court empha-
sized that union representation is intended to provide the
best deal for the greatest number of employees. 23 6 The junior
cannot even be considered one of the "greatest number of em-
ployees" since he is not, or will not become an employee dur-
ing the term of the agreement. The broad application of the
labor exemption, however, allows the agreement to reach the
junior.
Similarly, the junior is not aligned with Zimmerman23 7
because he has not elected to enter the professional sports
arena prior to challenging the college draft. The Zimmerman
court explained that one purpose of limiting the labor exemp-
230. Each player has an individual skill in which he excels. For example,
Shaquille O'Neil dominates in shot blocking, Mark Price shoots three-pointers,
and John Stockton gives assists. It is rare to see an all-around player like
Michael Jordan, who excels everywhere on the court.
231. The NBA consists of only 324 active players. 1988 NBA Agreement,
supra note 6, Art. XXVI, § 1.
232. See Lock, supra note 26, at 354-55.
233. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Willmar Elec. Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
234. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
236. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
237. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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tion to parties of the collective bargaining relationship is "to
withhold the exemption from agreements that primarily af-
fect . . .economic actors completely removed from the bar-
gaining relationship."238 A pre-college man, like the junior, is
"completely removed from the bargaining relationship" since
it cannot be determined if he will be an employee during the
term of the agreement.
If courts allow the labor exemption to apply to such a re-
mote player, essentially, they would be promoting the an-
ticompetitive activity of buyers of services, and the spirit of
the Sherman Act would be undermined.239 Considering the
labor disputes of 1994-1995, whether the college draft provi-
sion will be included in future agreements is questionable.
240
Because of the constant turnover in the industry,24 ' the
desires of the majority of players are also changing. Further,
at some point, the majority of players in the league will not
have been parties to the collective bargaining agreement.
The agreement should not bind that group of players who did
not formally agree to it. 242 In conclusion, the junior's class is
too remote to determine that it is covered by the college draft.
b. Remote Players are Affected by the College
Draft
Since the remote player is not a party to the collective
bargaining relationship, the labor exemption will not apply if
he is affected by the college draft.243 In the above hypotheti-
cal, the college draft affects the junior's ability to choose when
to enter the league.244 The college draft represses the sala-
238. Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C.
1986).
239. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.
241. For example, the NFL has a 25% league-wide turnover rate. Lock,
supra note 26, at 397.
242. The rookie salary scale implemented in the 1995 agreement between
the NBA and NBPA capped the 1995 draftees' salaries at approximately $3.3
million per year for a three-year contract. Harvey Araton, Less Pay, More Pres-
sure Greet N.B.A. Newcomers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at G1. This agree-
ment was made by those veteran players who would not be affected by the cap,
including those players who signed contracts just under $100 million the prior
year. Id.
243. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
244. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
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ries of those entering the league.245 If the junior wants to
become eligible for the draft when he graduates from high
school, his potential salary would be lower than if he waited
until the collective bargaining agreement expired.248 If he
decides to attend college and wait to see if the college draft
will be included in future agreements, the junior will spend
money on tuition and books, rather than earn money.
Other factors are relevant to the junior's choice between
entering the college draft and attending college. Such ele-
ments include desire for education, tentative position in the
draft,2 4 7 incentive to develop skills, and financial hardship.248
The implementation of the college draft, however, remains
among these ingredients because the chance to play profes-
sional sports does not fall upon all men.249 When the oppor-
tunity arises, a talented player will want to enter the league
instead of risking injury while playing intercollegiate
sports.25 °
Because a player who is not currently involved with the
league has not challenged any player restrictions, it appears
that courts would not extend the labor exemption to remote
players who have a stake in the effect of the college draft, but
would find a violation of antitrust law.251
245. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
247. The players picked in the college draft's higher positions usually obtain
better salaries. For example, the 1994 number one draft pick signed a contract
worth over $68 million. Gary Shelton, Insanity Puts NBA Ship on Crash
Course, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at C1.
248. Lock Interview, supra note 158.
249. See supra note 231.
250. See Sam Smith, Garnett's NBA Potential Rates No More than a Big?,
CHi. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1995, at C10 (reviewing NBA players who skipped college,
most notably Shawn Kemp of Seattle). But see Adrian Wojnarowski, Garnett's
Success, Our Failure, FRESNO BEE, July 23, 1995, at D1 (indicating that, be-
cause Garnett did not meet the NCAA freshman eligibility standards, he de-
clared himself eligible for the NBA draft).
251. In Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977), the court stated:
[lt is difficult for me to conceive of any theory or set of circumstances
pursuant to which the college draft, blacklisting, boycotts and refusals
to deal could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation, even if [the
NBA was] able to prove at trial their highly dubious contention that
these restraints were adopted at the behest of the Players' Association.
Id. at 895.
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D. The College Draft Violates Antitrust Law
Under the assumption that the labor exemption does not
prevent a remote potential player from challenging the col-
lege draft, the application of antitrust law to the draft must
be further examined. As noted, the rule of reason analysis is
applicable to the player restraints enforced in professional
sports.252 The reasonableness of the restraint is determined
by inquiring whether it is justified by a legitimate business
purpose and is not more restrictive than necessary.253 The
following section analyzes whether the college draft is rea-
sonable under the rule of reason.
1. Restraint on Trade
The college draft acts as a restraint on players in the
trade of their talents.25 4 For example, the junior in the hypo-
thetical above would not be allowed to participate in the
league unless he agreed to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.25 If he did submit himself to the agreement,
he would have a lower salary as a result of negotiating with
only one team.256 Hence, the college draft has the effect of a
group boycott because the teams have refused to deal with
players.257
Additionally, the junior's salary is suppressed because
the teams have agreed not to compete with each other in the
purchase of his services. 258 The college draft has the effect of
price fixing, because negotiation with one team eliminates
economic competition in the hiring of players.25 9
Consequently, the presence of the college draft inhibits
the choices the junior can make when he graduates from high
school. Limiting the junior's choices of when and where he
may practice his trade is the ultimate restraint on trade. 6 °
252. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
259. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
260. "[W]hatever other conduct the [antitrust] Acts may forbid, they cer-
tainly forbid all restraints of trade which were unlawful at common-law, and
one of the oldest and best established of these is a contract which unreasonably
forbids anyone to practice his calling." Mackey v. National Football League,
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2. No Legitimate Business Purpose
The leagues have consistently believed the college draft
is necessary to achieve competitive balance in the game.26 1
The argument states that if the draft was not present, the
better players would want to play with the most lucrative
teams.262 As a result, the successful teams in large markets
would be able to "stack" their roster with the best players and
dominate in playing competition. 263 Without the college draft
and other player restraints,264 the leagues predicted that
both the quality of the game and the leagues' viability would
decline.265
The effect of the college draft in maintaining the competi-
tive balance is subject to debate. First, the lottery system im-
plemented by the NBA to determine what team drafts first
indicates the flaw in the league's argument that the worst
team should have first choice.266 One view indicates that "the
lottery system is more of a public relations event than an op-
portunity for the clubs which don't qualify for the playoffs to
participate in a system to bring parity to the league."267
Whether the less successful teams need the college draft to
survive is equally questionable, because the lottery system
and ability to trade draft picks does not guarantee a specific
position in the draft.268
Second, there are factors other than salary that deter-
mine a player's choice of team. Such factors include unre-
543 F.2d 606, 622 n.32 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949)), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
261. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See
also WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 595.
262. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 596.
263. Id.
264. One restraint is the salary cap which limits players' salaries. In ex-
change for a guaranteed percentage of team's gross defined revenue, the players
agreed to a ceiling on the total amount the team may spend on salaries. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(citing 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. VII), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995). Also, free agency restrictions inhibit players from moving between
teams. Under the Right of First Refusal system, a team has the ability to
match any offer to its player who has played for less than four years or has not
completed at least two contracts. If the team matches the offer, the player can-
not move to the other team. Id. (citing 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art.
V).
265. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 596.
266. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
267. Steinberg, supra note 163, § 7.03(1).
268. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 624.
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lated business opportunities, educational opportunities, ra-
cial discrimination and general community atmosphere,
climate, disputes with owners, and disagreements with
coaching staff and management.26 9 With these outside influ-
ences, it is difficult to ascertain what drives a player to choose
a certain team. The college draft, however, does not allow the
incoming player to even make a choice.
Finally, the leagues have failed to show the relative im-
pact the college draft has on the playing competition.2 7 0 Re-
gardless of the talent a team acquires in the draft, the
chances of that team having an immediate impact in the
league are minimal. 7  In addition, other player restraints,
such as the salary cap and free agency terms, essentially re-
sult in keeping team expenses and movement of players lim-
ited. 2  It appears that the greater influence on a team's suc-
cess is management organization, coaching and scouting
staff, and making trades or selecting draft choices. 273
The Smith court recognized that the impact of the college
draft was different when the leagues were first developing. 4
Because of factors such as television broadcasting, changes in
coaching staff, and management of the organization, teams
are equally competitive regardless of their standing in the
college draft.275 In conclusion, the benefits of the college
269. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(citing Joint Appendix filed with the court).
270. Id. See also WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 623.
271. In 1992, the Orlando Magic used the number one draft pick for Sha-
quille O'Neil. That year, the team did not make it to the playoffs. But, the
Charlotte Hornets, with number two pick Alonzo Mourning, did go to the play-
offs. Lacy J. Banks, This Season's Elements of Surprise, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Apr.
19, 1993, at 21. Comparatively, with player restraints similar to the NBA, the
NFL has had 12 out of the 28 teams fail to make a Super Bowl appearance since
the 1970 NFL-AFL merger. NFC Championship Preview, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
15, 1995, at C1.
272. John Steigerwald, An Antiquated Idea, Pirr. POST GAZETTE, Oct. 22,
1994, at C3 (supporting the elimination of the NFL college draft because it has
been made obsolete by the salary cap and free agency restrictions).
273. Steinberg, supra note 163, § 7.03(3)(a).
274. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1185 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Before 1950, the leagues were not influenced by television broadcasting, which
brought greater exposure to professional sports. Id. The NFL allocates televi-
sion revenues equally among the teams for financial stability. Id. The NBA's
salary cap limits the amount each team can spend on player salaries to promote
a stable league. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. VII.
275. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185 n.46.
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draft once perceived by the teams have dissipated as the
leagues have become more sophisticated.
3. The College Draft is More Restrictive than
Necessary
The NBA college draft restricts the top fifty-four players
entering the league from negotiating with any team for their
services.276 As noted in Smith, "[tihe draft inescapably forces
each seller of football services to deal with one, and only one
buyer, robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic [sic] mar-
ket, of any real bargaining power."277 Notwithstanding the
apparent need to maintain competitive balance, "the draft is
anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players' serv-
ices, because it virtually eliminates economic competition
among buyers for the services of sellers."2 78
The college draft challenged in Smith consisted of sixteen
rounds which restricted 386 players.279 Like the NFL college
draft, the NBA draft is concerned with dispersing the best
players.28 ° Since even average players are affected by the
draft,28 ' there are less restrictive alternatives to accommo-
date the leagues.28 2
First, the provision restricting the draftee to negotiate
with one team if required tender is delivered could be
changed. As it now applies, the offer is hollow, since teams
will meet the required tender to retain exclusive bargaining
rights.28 3 The team only has to offer the minimum salary ap-
plicable to the player in the required tender.28 4 This provi-
sion could be modified to allow the draftee to negotiate with
other teams if the drafting team offers the minimum salary.
A change in the required tender does not upset the competi-
tive balance between teams, because it will only make a team
offer in "honesty."
276. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(a).
277. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185.
278. Id. at 1186.
279. Id. at 1175.
280. Id. at 1187.
281. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D.D.C. 1976) ("In
each crop of college players there are 5 to 10 'blue chip' or virtually certain 'all-
pro' players."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
282. See supra note 191.
283. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
284. 1988 NBA Agreement, supra note 6, Art. IV, § 1(b).
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Second, elimination of the college draft would allow play-
ers to freely market their services. With the salary cap,285
there are limits on the salary levels so that teams do not have
to be concerned about expenses.286 Also, since players are not
strictly concerned about salary, they will not migrate to the
lucrative teams.28 v
Smith states that "a player draft can survive scrutiny
under the rule of reason only if it is demonstrated to have
positive, economically procompetitive benefits that offset its
anticompetitive effect."288 The NBA college draft no longer
has any demonstrable procompetitive benefits because of the
acknowledged advancements in the league.289 In addition,
the anticompetitive effect is large because the college draft
does act as a restraint on the players' ability to market their
services.29 °
Antitrust law was enacted to prevent interference of
trade. 291 The potential players are supplying the leagues
with their trade. The college draft inherently restrains the
players from obtaining the best price for their talents. The
college draft's interference with a man's ability to play profes-
sional sports is what antitrust law was designed to pre-
vent.292 Therefore, a remote potential player could success-
fully challenge the college draft. As the hypothetical
illustrates, however, only certain potential players can take
advantage of antitrust laws.
IV. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes eliminating the dichotomy that
exists between those potential players who can successfully
challenge the college draft and those who cannot. There are
two options that will effectively meet this goal. First, this
comment proposes bridging the gap between the two types of
285. See supra note 264.
286. Steigerwald, supra note 272 (Mrhe salary cap does what the draft was
invented to do. It protects the owners from themselves. By keeping college
players guessing about their value, even in an every-man-for-himself situation,
teams would pay no more than they're paying now.").
287. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
288. Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
289. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 260.
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players by providing a statute that specifically accommodates
the unique aspects of professional sports. Alternatively, if
the current antitrust and labor laws still apply on a case-by-
case basis, the void can be filled by narrowing the scope of the
term "employees" strictly in professional sports cases. Each
option is discussed and evaluated in the following sections.
A. Professional Sports Statute
The current antitrust and labor laws were developed for
the purpose of maintaining competition in an industrial set-
ting.293 The current statutory scheme does not adequately
address the problems discussed in this comment because of
the unique nature of professional sports.294 The most effec-
tive way to eliminate the dichotomy between those players
who can successfully challenge player restraints and those
who cannot, is to amend the statutes to include a provision
addressing professional sports.
1. The Current Law Supports the Proposed Statute
Antitrust laws contain a section that exempts profes-
sional sports under certain circumstances. 295  First, the
teams can jointly agree to sell or transfer rights in telecasting
the games they produce.296 Second, the NFL was granted the
right to merge with the American Football League (AFL)
without violating antitrust laws against monopolies.297
Otherwise, professional sports are subject to the Sherman
Act.298 Since Congress was able to enact these statutes with-
out compromising the purpose of the antitrust laws, it is
equally capable of creating a law that addresses the problem
of the labor exemption reaching remote players.
The proposed statute would be an amendment to the
NLRA, since its purpose is to protect the interests of the labor
market rather than to completely exempt professional sports
from antitrust law.299 The proposed statute would first con-
tain a provision recognizing that the NLRA is applicable to
293. SULLIVAN, supra note 44, at 20.
294. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
295. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. § 1294. Recall that MLB is the only professional sports league ex-
empt from antitrust law. See supra note 42.
299. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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the services of professional sports players. For example, the
statute could state:
To equalize the bargaining position of professional sports
players with the power of the owners, teams, and leagues,
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are ap-
plicable to those professional sports players who organize
to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection.
Through this provision, the players will explicitly be author-
ized to form labor organizations and to collectively
bargain.3 0 0
2. Specific Sections to Eliminate the Problem
Next, the proposed statute should contain a provision
specifically addressing the problem of the labor exemption.
Elimination of this problem can be achieved using one of the
following two methods.
a. Limit the Expiration of Collective Bargaining
Agreements
The first way to eliminate the dichotomy between differ-
ent players is to limit the time length of any collective bar-
gaining agreement between the leagues and players. The
proposed provision could state:
Any collective bargaining agreement between professional
sports leagues, teams, owners, and the players' selected
bargaining representative shall not have a term longer
than four (4) years.
If the collective bargaining agreement is limited to four
or less years, the reach of the labor exemption would also be
limited. The labor exemption applies to those players in the
collective bargaining relationship.30 1 The courts have deter-
mined that potential players are part of the collective bar-
gaining relationship when they enter the league during the
term of the agreement.3 0 2 If the agreement had a shorter
time length, it would not reach as many remote players.
For example, an agreement lasting from 1995 to 1999
would only apply to those men in college during that time. It
300. See id. § 157.
301. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
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would not encompass the high school senior or junior dis-
cussed in the illustrative hypothetical because they would not
be entering the league until 2001 and 2002, respectively. 0 3
Limiting the time period that the agreement covers
would also meet the unique needs of professional sports be-
cause it takes into consideration the high turnover of play-
ers.3 0 4 With the constant change of players in the league, it
cannot be determined if the majority supports the union. A
shorter agreement will allow the current players to re-evalu-
ate the union more often. If the majority does not approve of
the union, they can vote to decertify and bargain
individually.3 °5
The continuous evaluation of the union will also pressure
it to bargain in the interest of entering players. For example,
if the high school junior decides to immediately enter the
league, he will be subject to the collective bargaining agree-
ment which expires in 1998. However, he will only have to
play under those terms for two years, after which he can pro-
mote a change in terms or the union. Consequently, a statute
mandating the limited time period of collective bargaining
agreements in professional sports addresses the problem of
the agreement reaching remote players.
b. Develop Separate Bargaining Units for Current
Players and Potential Players
Alternatively, the proposed statute could contain a provi-
sion differentiating between current player bargaining units
and potential player bargaining units. The NLRA specifically
excludes certain employees from different bargaining
units.30 6 Bargaining units are segregated because the em-
ployees have different interests that cannot be adequately
represented by one union.3 0 7 Similarly, the interests of cur-
rent players conflict with those of potential players.3 08  For
example, the veteran players are concerned with player
303. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
304. Lock, supra note 26, at 354.
305. See supra note 211.
306. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988) (prohibiting the NLRB from certifying a unit
consisting of professional employees and those who are not professionals).
307. The NLRB shall create bargaining units "in order to assure to employ-
ees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [NLRA]." Id.
308. See Lock, supra note 26, at 354 (discussing the different interests of
superstars and marginal players).
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movement and no salary restrictions while in the league,
whereas potential players want freedom to negotiate with
any team when entering the league. 30 9 These two desires
conflict because the veteran players may compromise the en-
tering players' position to benefit themselves. Recent exam-
ples of this conflict are the new NBA and NHL agreements.
The current NBA players agreed to a rookie salary scale,
while the NHL players chose a salary limit for rookies in lieu
of a salary cap as a whole.3 10 Because of these conflicts, the
players' unions have a difficult time representing both
groups. Thus, a statute segregating the current players from
the potential players is feasible. Such statute could state:
The NLRB shall not decide that any unit is appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining if such unit con-
sists of both current professional sports players and those
potential players who are not currently playing for the
specific league.
Once the potential players have their own bargaining
representative, if their interests are not being adequately
met, they can reach the union through a breach of the duty of
fair representation. 11 In addition, the agreements that are
made in good faith would be subject to the labor exemption
for all potential players.3 1 2
Both of the proposed statute sections are in harmony
with the current labor law policy. First, the proposed stat-
utes encourage labor organization as well as leagues' negotia-
tion with the selected representative. 1 Second, since the
other provisions of the NLRA would apply to the employer-
employee relationship, the parties would have remedies for
309. Compare Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp 960
(D.N.J. 1987) (veterans challenging college player draft, salary cap, and right of
first refusal) with Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987) (unsigned draftee challenging college draft, salary cap, and prohibition of
players corporations). The salary cap is a concern for both groups because it
operates as a ceiling on the total amount a team may spend on all players' sala-
ries. National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
310. See NHL Players Accept Final Offer - Season Saved, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
12, 1995, at Al; see also The Deal, supra note 20, at 126.
311. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987)
(suggesting a cause of action against the union for breach of fair representation
in discrimination against new employees instead of an antitrust action).
312. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
313. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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violation of the proposed statutes. 14 Finally, the proposed
statutes address the problem of the college draft being ap-
plied to men remote from the bargaining unit. By allowing
both current and potential players the opportunity to chal-
lenge the college draft provisions, either through collective
bargaining or antitrust law, the proposed statutes bridge the
gap created by the labor exemption.
B. Narrow Judicial Interpretation of "Employees"
Even if the proposed statute scheme is not implemented,
the courts could resolve the identified problem by narrowing
the scope of "employees" as applied in the first element of the
Mackey test to one which is applicable only in professional
sports cases. The current broad application of the term "em-
ployees" reaches players too remote from the collective bar-
gaining relationship.3 15 As a result, there is a dichotomy be-
tween potential players who can possibly challenge the
college draft and those who cannot.
The broad standard, however, was created to meet the
needs of industrial workers.3 16 Because of the unique charac-
teristics of the professional sports industry, the application of
this standard in professional sports cases has been mis-
placed.317 A narrower standard has been supported by the
Supreme Court even in industrial cases. 318 Regardless, such
standard could be limited to professional sports cases because
the industry is not comparable to other industries.3 1 9
A narrow application of "employees" would take remote
potential players outside the collective bargaining relation-
ship and allow them to challenge the terms of the agreement
314. Id. § 158. But see Lock, supra note 26, at 409 (criticizing the remedies
available as too lenient in the professional sport arena).
315. See discussion supra part III.C.2.
316. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
317. Lock, supra note 26, at 418.
318. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971) ("[L]egislative history ... itself indicates
that the term 'employees' is not to be stretched beyond its plain meaning em-
bracing only those who work for another for hire.").
319. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. However, Wood II com-
pared the draft to hiring practices of other industries. Wood v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). The court further indicated "[i]f
Wood's antitrust claim were to succeed, all of these common place arrange-
ments would be subject to similar challenges, and federal labor policy would
essentially collapse unless a wholly unprincipled, judge-made exception were
created for professional athletes." Id. at 961.
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under antitrust law.32 0 Because these remote players have
an interest in the trade of their labor, they should not be sub-
ject to restraints imposed on them by parties who have no
incentive to fairly represent them. The narrow standard
would also accomplish labor policy, because persons who did
not express approval of the collective bargaining representa-
tive would not be subject to the terms of its agreements. 2 '
Although a statutory scheme is more consistent, the
courts can also implement rules that address the problems
discussed in this comment. So long as courts uniformly apply
a narrow meaning to "employees," the remote potential play-
ers will have equal success in challenging the college draft.
By narrowing the first element of the Mackey test to exclude
potential employees, 32 the labor exemption does not over-
reach its purpose and bar persons outside the collective bar-
gaining relationship from bringing antitrust action against
the leagues.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the NBA has not faced interruptions in its sea-
son like MLB and the NHL, there is no guarantee such an
event will not occur without a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The college draft has been included in collective bar-
gaining agreements since the players have been unionized.323
If the next NBA agreement contains a college draft provision,
it may be subject to antitrust law if it is challenged by a re-
mote potential player.324 However, courts' application of the
labor exemption to agreements between leagues and players
creates a dichotomy between those potential players who can
successfully challenge and those who cannot.325
This comment proposes to eliminate the differences be-
tween potential players in one of three ways.326 First, a stat-
ute could be added to the NLRA limiting the time length of
professional sports collective bargaining agreements. Sec-
320. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
321. The employee group has the right to refrain from collective bargaining
activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
322. See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
323. See discussion supra part II.C.
324. See discussion supra part III.
325. See discussion supra part III.
326. See discussion supra part IV.
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ond, a statute amending the NLRA could create separate bar-
gaining units for current and potential players. Third, courts
could uniformly narrow their interpretation of "employees"
when applying the test for the labor exemption. Without
these changes, professional sports lawyers, agents, leagues,
and players will continue to be uncertain as to who is covered
by the collective bargaining agreements between the leagues
and the players' unions.
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